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Abstract 
 
In the recent years, the ‘black economy’ has held enormous appeal for policy 
makers. Presence of black economy creates critical misrepresentation of 
macroeconomic variables in official estimates that lead to the false determination 
and delusional impact of economic policies. Similarly, black economy represents 
the unrecorded potential of the economy vis-à-vis resource generation and 
mobilization. The Economy of Pakistan underwent several minor tax reforms since 
1960’s. However, the tax and tariff reform of 1990’s, committed under 
international pressure, was the first comprehensive exercise and therefore it 
becomes highly desirable to gauge its impact on the black economy and tax evasion 
practices. This paper, with some modifications, uses the standard monetary 
approach to obtain the latest estimates of the size of black economy and its 
macroeconomic implications thereof. 
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1. Introduction 
 
An ample share of economic activities takes place outside the official or recorded economy all over the 
world, in general, and in developing economies, in particular. There are at least three major concerns 
associated with the existence of underground or black economy. First, the possibility of biased evaluation 
of economic and social conditions of economic agents, and thus sub-optimal policies, if one disregards 
the hidden economy. Second, loss of precious tax revenue escaped from collection channels thereby 
increasing the cost of providing public services. And third, indication of shaken trust between government 
and economic agents1. Furthermore, the evaded or lost income shows the potential immobilized resources 
that should have been a part of national income. If the underground economy is large and significant, 
there is a clear evidence of market distortions, poor governance and/or disproportionate administrative 
regulations. 
 
Albeit there is a consensus on the presence of underground economy, the phenomenon has been discussed 
and defined in the literature under many different names such as unofficial, informal, unregistered, 
unobserved, shadow, subterranean, parallel, hidden, invisible and irregular. Nevertheless, the purpose 
behind all these definitions is to link the underground economy to official national income so as to 
compare and add these figures to GNP. Conceptually, there are four classifications of underground 
economy made according to the particular institutional rules they violate. These are, illegal Economy, 
unreported Economy, unrecorded Economy and informal Economy2. Moreover, as Schneider and Frey 
(2001) points out, the notion of underground or black economy should not only be identified with  
illegality. Most of the activities are perfectly legal but the taxes are evaded due to different reasons and 
loopholes. 
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The present effort addresses the issue of the size of unreported economy in Pakistan and therefore we are 
explicitly interested in estimating the resources that are lost due to tax evasion and avoidance. In this 
regard, we use, with some modifications, the methodology adopted by Ahmed and Ahmed (1995). The 
revisit to this issue is of critical importance especially after taking into account the tax reforms exercise 
started in early 90s under the influence of IMF and stringently beefed up in late 90s.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the review of selected literature, section 3 illustrates 
the methodology, section 4 elucidates the results and finally section 5 concludes the discussion with some 
policy implications. 
 
2. Review of Selected Literature 
 
Frey et al (1984) pointed out four approaches for measuring the size of black economy. These are tax 
evasion approach, national accounts approach, employment approach and monetary approach. Out of 
these methods, monetary approach is by far the most widely used methodology in estimating the black 
economy due to its simplicity. The pioneering efforts in this area are of Gutmann (1977), Feige (1979) 
and Tanzi (1983). Gutmann (1977) estimated the size of United States’ black economy and came up with 
the figure of $200 billion. He first calculated the ratio of currency to demand deposits for the period 1937-
41 (the benchmark period) and then for 1976. He then calculated the difference of ratios and thus the 
extra currency between these two periods. Multiplied by the ratio of GNP to legal money, this extra 
currency gave the size of black economy. Criticism on Gutmann’s approach is the use of demand deposits 
in the numerator. This approach assumes that the increase in to ratio would attract people to hold more 
currency by withdrawing from demand deposits. However, they may instead convert their money from 
demand to time deposits. Feige (1979) presented his model based on quantity theory of money by 
formulating 
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PT = MV + M’V’          (1) 
 
Where M and M’ are currency notes and demand deposits respectively, V and V’ are Velocities (or 
average turnover) of money respectively of currency notes and demand deposits, P is composite price 
index of existing and newly produced goods and T is volume of transactions. In this approach, the 
estimated PT is divided by the observed income to GNP ratio to get the size of black economy where 
observed income is the product of price index of newly produced goods and real income of the economy. 
He formulized that the derived nominal GNP and official GNP are the same in the absence of black 
economy. Tanzi (1980, 1983) formulated his methodology based on Cagen’s (1958) work. Cagen 
explained that the long run behavior of currency-money supply-ratio depends upon expected real per 
capita income, volume of retail trade, volume of travel per capita, degree of urbanization and tax rate on 
transactions. According to him, the higher the tax rates, the more the transactions made by currency 
payments to avoid reporting to tax collector. Tanzi (1980) re-hypothesized the same link between tax rate 
and currency-money supply ratio to obtain the alternative estimates of US black economy. He assumed 
that currency is used to carry out transactions in the black economy and high taxes are the forces behind 
the size of black economy. Tanzi (1980, 1983) postulated the currency in circulation to money supply 
ratio ( )2MC  as a function of top bracket statutory tax rate, weighted average rate on interest income, 
ratio of personal income tax to personal income net of transfers ( )sTi' , share of wages and salaries in 
national income ( )niws , interest rate ( )r and per capita income ( )pY . The expected signs for both pY  and 
r  are negative. This is because economic development in the country, measured by per capita income, is 
assumed to lead to the replacement of currency by cheques, thus causing a fall in 2MC . Higher interest 
rates encourage people to invest currency holdings in time and other forms of deposits and thereby 
reducing the volume of currency in circulation. On the other hand, higher taxes motivate people in 
indulge in tax evading activities that are facilitated by the use of currency. Moreover, as the wages are 
paid in currency, especially of daily workers, an increase in wages will require more currency. Tanzi 
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(1982) also estimated the extant of evaded taxes by multiplying the underground economy by tax to GNP 
ratio. Tanzi’s methodology is considered to be the most sophisticated one in estimating black economy 
through monetary approach 
 
In the context of Pakistan, all attempts followed the Tanzi’s approach with some modifications. Shabsigh 
(1995) used the ratio of currency in circulation to demand deposits (M2 minus currency in circulation) as 
the dependant variable, while the independent variables were real per capita income, real interest rate, per 
capita banking services, taxes on imports, exports and domestic services. He concluded that the size of 
black economy was 21 percent of GDP in 1975 declined slightly to 20.4 percent of GDP in 1990. Ahmed 
and Ahmed (1995) came up with the result that this size was declined from 52 percent in 1960 to 35 
percent in 1990. Iqbal et al (1998) used currency in circulation to M2 ratio as dependant variable while 
domestic tax to GDP ratio, international taxes to GDP ratio, real interest rate, real per capita income 
growth and banking services are used as explanatory variables. They also used a dummy for the period 
1988 to 1996 to capture the effect of structural adjustment program. They concluded that the underground 
economy has increased from 20 percent of GDP in 1973 to 51 percent in 1996. Aslam (1998) introduced 
ratio of currency in circulation and foreign currency accounts to M2 as dependant variable. Independent 
variables include: total tax revenue to GDP ratio, interest rate on time deposits and a dummy for the 
period 1991-1998 in order to capture the effect of introduction of the foreign currency accounts in 1991. 
He reveals that the underground economy has been increased from 29 percent of GDP in 1960 to 44 
percent in 1990. Kemal (2003) used the same dependent variable as Aslam (1998) and the explanatory 
variables were tax to GDP ratio, banking services, GDP growth rate and a dummy for the period 1990-
2002. He came up with the results that underground economy has increased from 20 percent of GDP in 
1974 to 54 percent in 1998 and then declined again to 37 percent in 2002. He also used a lagged 
dependant variable to capture the inertia in variables. Yasmin and Rauf (2004), using the similar 
methodology, found out that the growth rate of underground economy remained 12.7% and of tax evasion 
10.9% between 2001-2002 as against 5.9% growth of GDP. They also ran two other equations with GDP 
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as dependant variable in both. Explanatory variables in first equation were tax evasion and lag of GDP 
and in second equation size of underground economy and lag of GDP. They confirmed significant 
negative effect of both tax evasion and underground economy on GDP. 
 
As evident, a comparison of these studies in the context of Pakistan reveals contradicting results vis-à-vis 
the size of black economy. Econometrically, the bases of these alternative results may include (i) the 
choice of variables, (ii) choice of the estimation period and (iii) choice of the functional form and 
underlying assumptions. Short run fluctuations in the selected macroeconomic variables may also distort 
the inference.  Moreover, despite the use of different dummies, no study tried to capture the impact of 
taxation reforms of 1990s on the underground economy and this is one of the focuses of our study.  
 
3. Data and Estimation Methodology 
 
The model subject to estimation is based on the methodology of Ahmed and Ahmed (1995) with a slight 
modification3. We formulate 
 
edLnrtgrLnLncm +++++= 974210 )1(2 ββββ       (2) 
 
where cm2 is the Ratio of currency in circulation to money supply m2, tgr is overall tax to GDP ratio, r is 
weighted average rate of return on deposits and d97 is the tax reform dummy, taking the value of 1 from 
1997 onwards. We hypothesize a positive link between tax to GDP ratio and currency to M2. An increase 
in the tax rate stimulates people to evade them through using currency transactions instead of cheques. On 
the other hand, increase in the rate of return would induce people to invest in deposits and thereby 
reducing the currency-money supply ratio. 
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Besides the currency ratio equation, another dependant variable is used in a separate regression with same 
explanatory variables. This dependant variable includes bearer bonds along with the currency in 
circulations. Bearer bonds were introduced in mid 80’s to enhance the savings and investment in the 
economy. These bonds were particularly attractive for black money since they can be obtained in 
unlimited quantities and without any cumbersome procedure. Since they are easily convertible into cash 
at any time, they can serve as currency themselves. Therefore, the second regression is  
 
edLnrtgrLnLncbm +++++= 974210 )1(2 ββββ       (3) 
 
Where cbm2 is (currency + bearer bonds’ value)/(M2 + bearer bonds’ value). Moreover, as mentioned 
above, most of the macroeconomic variables are subject to short run fluctuations and thus the resulting 
variance may distort the results. To cope with this problem, we use the HP filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 
1997) to remove cyclical variations from independent variables. More specifically, let yt be a series 
composed of two components: a cyclical component (ct) and a trend component (τt). HP filter isolates ct 
from τt by minimizing the variance of yt. To do this, HP filter uses a penalty parameter λ to control the 
smoothness of the series τt. The larger the value of λ, the smoother the series and τt becomes a perfect 
linear trend as λ→ ∞. There are various critiques on the use of HP filter for smoothing a series and 
researchers point out some of the undesirable properties associated with it (Ahumada and Garegnani, 
1999 and Ravn and Uhlig, 1997). Ravn and Uhlig (1997, p.1), nonetheless, suggest that ‘none of these 
shortcomings and undesirable properties are particularly compelling: HP filter has withstood the test of 
the time and the fire of discussion remarkably well’. Likewise, Ahumada and Gargnani (1999, p.18) 
conclude that the criticized drawbacks of HP filter ‘do not appear to have had great effects on its wide 
use in empirical research’. Figures 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) in the appendix-A compare the actual and filtered 
series used in regression. Different values of smoothing penalty λ are chosen for different variables 
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depending upon the empirical practices4. Furthermore, we use the Moving Average (MA) technique to 
deal with the problem of autocorrelation in both equations. 
 
Rest of the analysis follows the typical path. From equation 2, predicted value of ratio cm2 is computed 
for each year first with tax variable (cm2t) and then without tax variable (cm2wt). The difference between 
tax and without tax ratio gives us an indication regarding the level of currency holdings stimulated by 
taxes. This difference is multiplied by M2 to obtain the level of illegal money. Mathematically: 
 
Illegal Money (IM) = (cm2t – cm2wt) . M2       (4) 
 
Size of the Black economy can be obtained by multiplying illegal money by velocity of money. Velocity 
of money equals the ratio of GNP to legal money. Moreover, total money in the economy can either be 
legal or illegal. Therefore, legal money is computed by taking the difference between total money supply 
and illegal money. Mathematically:  
 
Legal Money (LM) = M2 – IM         (5) 
 
Velocity of Money 
LM
GNPv =)(          (6) 
 
Black Economy (BE) = IM . v         (7) 
 
Finally, level of tax evasion is obtained by multiplying the size of black economy to the ratio of tax-to-
GNP.  
Tax Evasion = 


GNP
TaxesBE.          (8) 
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The same process is applied for equation 3. Furthermore, we assume that the velocity of money is the 
same for both illegal and legal money. Rationally, when the black money is used in regular markets for 
transactions, it should behave in the same manner as white money in order to appear regular and trustful. 
The data for our analysis covers the period 1960 to 2003 and obtained from various issues of Pakistan 
Economic Survey and State Bank of Pakistan’s Annual Reports.  
 
4. Estimation Results 
 
Table 1 shows the results from regression equations 2 and 3. All variables are highly significant at 1 
percent level. Moreover, goodness of fit and F-ratio are also quite high. In both regressions, tax-to-GDP 
ratio (tgr) possesses the positive sign confirming the hypothesis of increasing currency-money supply 
ratio with increasing tax rates. Sign of weighted average rate of return (r) is negative, which also confirms 
our hypothesis that the higher the rates of returns on deposits, the higher the savings and the lower the 
currency-M2 ratio. The coefficients of these two variables, especially tgr, are quite higher than Ahmed 
and Ahmed (1995). The reason is the use of filtered tgr and r, which removed the cyclical fluctuations, 
thus increasing the coefficients by making the trend components in both the series stronger.  
Table 1 
Regression results 
  Equation 2  Equation 3 
  Currency Ratio (cm2) Currency + Bond Ratio (cbm2) 
  Coefficient Standard Error p-value Coefficient
Standard 
Error p-value 
Constant -1.100 0.170 0.0000 -1.229 0.162 0.0000 
tgr 8.805 2.496 0.0011 10.311 2.346 0.0001 
r -0.597 0.075 0.0000 -0.584 0.072 0.0000 
d97 -0.344 0.057 0.0000 -0.233 0.059 0.0003 
N 44 44 
R2 0.88 0.85 
dw-statistic 1.77 1.70 
F-statistic 77.90  57.44 
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Dummy variable for tax reforms (d97) is also highly significant bearing the negative sign. Tax reform 
exercise reached at its peak in 1997 when quite a few important steps were taken. These steps include, 
inter alia, the substantial decrease in the personal income tax rate to 20 per cent, reduction in corporate tax 
rate, withdrawal of turnover tax and some of the withholding taxes, strengthening the tax administration 
and improvements in documentation. Negative sign of dummy in both the equations implies that these 
exercises were significant in reducing the cm2 and cbm2 ratios, and thus contracting the size of black 
economy. After the estimation, we obtained the size of black economy explained by equations 4 through 
8. The results are shown in Table 2 and 3. Black economy in Pakistan turns out to be highest in early 60s 
when the corporate and personal income tax rates were high. Corporate income tax rate was 30 percent 
plus 30 percent super tax. This (aggregate corporate income and super tax) rate was dropped to 40 percent 
in the later part of 80s. Likewise, the maximum personal income tax rate was 75 percent during 1960-64 
causing the black economy to remain well above 30 percent of GDP during the same period. Black 
economy kept declining during 1965-75 when this rate was brought down in between 60 and 70 percent 
(Qureshi, 1989, pp.23). Furthermore, this rate was 56 percent during 1980 –1986 brought down to 39 
percent in 1988 and further to 28 percent in 1993 – the effect of which is subsequently reflected by the 
squeezing black economy in the periods under review. This is also interesting to note that Kemal (2003) 
reports an increasing trend of black economy between 1995 and 1998– contrary to our results. Possible 
explanation could be the tax reform effect, which was absent in Kemal (2003). Furthermore, results of 
Kemal (2003) are based on a special specification where lagged dependent variable is used as explanatory 
variable with high positive coefficient.  
 
In the present study, the impact of tax reforms is dominating and evident from both tables 2 and 3. Black 
economy as percentage of GDP was declined by nine percentage points in case of both currency ratio and 
currency bearer bond equation during 1996 and 1997. The corresponding decline in tax evasion as 
percentage of GDP was 39 percent and 32 percent respectively for both methods. Figure 1 and 2 
respectively plot tgr and r against black economy to GDP ratio estimated using equation 25. Black 
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economy remained relatively high 
during early 90’s at around 26% of 
GDP.  During that period, tax-to-GDP 
ratio was almost stagnant at 13% and 
rate of return on deposits was falling - 
a disincentive to withdraw from black 
economic activities. Nevertheless, 
during 1996-97, tax-to-GDP ratio 
dropped to 12.7% after touching its 
peak of 14% coupled with the increase 
in rate of return from 6.4% to 6.8%. 
Both these factors, especially tax 
reform effect, played significant role in 
slashing the black economy. This is 
also imperative to note that the 
declination of tax to GDP further in 1999-00, which does not appear to have great impact on the size of 
black economy, was actually the result of re-basing of country’s GDP. On the other hand, the sharp 
decline of rate of return on deposits from 1998 onwards acted as a hurdle in reducing the size of black 
economy.  
 
The inclusion of bearer bond with currency in circulation, as table-2 shows, does not alter the direction of 
outcomes. It, however, is imperative to increases the magnitude of black economy as percentage of GDP. 
This suggests that bearer bonds are quite reliable medium of exchange in the underground economy 
alongside currency. Roughly, it can be seen that the inclusion of bearer bond increases, on average, the 
black economy as percentage of GDP by 5 percentage points each year. Bearer bonds were introduced 
during mid 80’s to promote savings in Pakistan. They became a handy medium of exchange later on due 
Figure 2: Black Economy-GDP ratio & Rate of Return
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to their limited physical quantity required for any transaction as against currency and their hassle-free 
acquisition. This is quite interesting to note that the annual compound growth rate of currency in 
circulation and bearer bonds during last two decades remained almost the same; i.e. 12 percent. 
Moreover, note also that the size of black economy has slightly increased from 2000 onwards. This is, 
perhaps, due to the reduction of rate of return on deposits, which was declined by more than 30 per cent 
between 2000 and 2003 revealing the loose stance of monetary policy. On the other hand, the effective 
coverage of indirect as well as direct taxes was increased during the same period. This brought some of 
the untaxed sectors into the tax net, causing the tax to GDP ratio to increase slightly by 0.26 percent 
during the same period. 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
In this paper, we attempted to estimate the size of unreported part of the economy that is caused by tax 
evasions. This becomes of special importance once the impact of taxation reforms is incorporated. 
Overall, black economy has a declining trend as percentage of GDP. This is due to the tax reforms 
involving rationalization of tax rates. Inclusion of bearer bonds as a medium of exchange significantly 
increases the size of the black economy. After their inception in mid 80’s, the volume of bearer bonds is 
growing almost at the same pace as currency in circulation. Despite the fact that black economy as a 
percentage of GDP has decreased, the annual compound growth rate of black economy during the sample 
period remained more than 11 percent. At disaggregated level, this growth remained 2 percent during 60s, 
17 percent during 70’s, 15 percent during 80s and 13 percent during 90s and afterwards (see table 3). 
Similarly, tax evasion grew at the rate of 12 percent. This growth remained 5 percent during 60s, 19 
percent during 70s, 16 percent during 80s and 11 percent during 90s and afterwards. These results are 
approximately same for both equations. This is also worth mentioning that due to the strong underlying 
assumptions of Tanzi (1980, 1983), the estimates of black economy cannot be taken as precise measures. 
They can, nevertheless, be effectively used to deduce the broad trend and directions. In the light of above 
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discussion, therefore, several suggestions pertaining to the policy actions can be made. Although Increase 
in the direct tax revenue is vital for a developing country because of its redistributive effects, the medium 
of this increase, nonetheless, cannot solely be the increase in tax rates since this give rise to tax evasion. 
Instead, broadening the tax base would be an ultimate solution. To supplement these efforts, official 
administration regarding the detection and hammering of tax evasion should be improved. Tax reform 
process should be consolidated and integrated with other macroeconomic reforms. System loopholes and 
prevailing corruption among the tax collection authorities cannot be neglected when dealing with the 
issue of evasion. These inefficiencies must be dealt accordingly in order to curb the tax deadweight loses 
and to reduce the cost of being part of the reported economy.  
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Table-2 
Estimates of Black Economy via Equation-2 
Year 
Illegal 
Money 
(Million 
Rs.) 
Legal 
Money 
(Million Rs.)
Velocity of 
Money 
Black 
Economy 
(Million Rs.)
Black 
Economy 
as % of 
GDP 
Tax 
Evasion 
(Million 
Rs.) 
Tax 
Evasion as 
% of GDP
1960 1,994 3,862 4.6 9,206 51.6 722 4.0 
1961 1,820 4,058 4.8 8,784 44.8 705 3.6 
1962 1,745 4,360 4.7 8,207 40.0 687 3.3 
1963 1,863 5,124 4.3 8,000 36.3 611 2.8 
1964 1,990 5,950 4.2 8,276 33.4 628 2.5 
1965 2,043 6,578 4.3 8,752 31.0 726 2.6 
1966 3,152 10,852 2.9 9,061 29.0 740 2.4 
1967 3,355 12,279 2.9 9,698 27.3 894 2.5 
1968 3,436 13,349 2.9 9,945 25.7 864 2.2 
1969 3,599 14,849 2.8 10,015 24.2 1,019 2.5 
1970 3,787 16,653 2.9 10,860 22.7 1,077 2.3 
1971 3,845 18,068 2.8 10,792 21.2 960 1.9 
1972 3,864 19,339 2.8 10,943 20.0 869 1.6 
1973 4,313 22,755 3.0 12,879 18.8 1,072 1.6 
1974 4,738 25,941 3.4 16,205 18.3 1,451 1.6 
1975 5,035 28,039 4.0 20,173 18.1 1,705 1.5 
1976 6,382 35,269 3.8 24,132 18.4 1,801 1.4 
1977 8,163 43,610 3.6 29,057 19.3 2,174 1.4 
1978 10,508 53,151 3.5 37,280 21.0 3,962 2.2 
1979 13,658 64,954 3.2 44,083 22.5 4,936 2.5 
1980 16,837 75,587 3.3 56,315 24.0 6,844 2.9 
1981 19,790 84,831 3.5 70,193 25.2 8,517 3.1 
1982 22,621 93,889 3.7 83,649 25.8 9,621 3.0 
1983 28,812 117,213 3.4 99,254 27.2 11,424 3.1 
1984 32,486 130,781 3.5 114,113 27.2 12,580 3.0 
1985 36,733 147,172 3.5 127,409 27.0 14,457 3.1 
1986 42,223 168,888 3.3 138,974 27.0 17,227 3.3 
1987 48,057 191,966 3.2 152,420 26.6 19,764 3.5 
1988 54,021 215,493 3.3 176,604 26.1 22,300 3.3 
1989 58,338 232,119 3.4 200,262 26.0 26,519 3.4 
1990 68,775 272,477 3.3 224,810 26.3 28,775 3.4 
1991 81,192 319,452 3.3 264,487 26.0 31,595 3.1 
1992 103,197 402,372 3.0 312,317 25.9 40,222 3.3 
1993 122,315 473,075 2.8 347,238 26.0 44,336 3.3 
1994 145,027 558,371 2.8 406,505 26.0 51,844 3.3 
1995 169,971 654,761 2.9 488,024 26.2 64,394 3.5 
1996 192,455 746,225 2.8 544,964 25.7 75,802 3.6 
1997 151,794 901,439 2.7 405,646 16.7 52,316 2.2 
1998 172,373 1,033,947 2.6 442,339 16.5 56,356 2.1 
1999 182,318 1,098,228 2.7 483,563 16.5 62,267 2.1 
2000 200,718 1,199,914 3.1 626,533 16.5 64,703 1.7 
2001 223,955 1,302,089 3.2 706,590 17.0 72,668 1.7 
2002 270,627 1,490,743 3.0 803,375 18.3 83,381 1.9 
2003 342,507 1,736,262 2.9 981,029 20.3 105,340 2.2 
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Table-3 
Estimates of Black Economy via Equation-3 
Year 
Illegal 
Money 
(Million 
Rs.) 
Legal 
Money 
(Million Rs.)
Velocity of 
Money 
Black 
Economy 
(Million Rs.)
Black 
Economy 
as % of 
GDP 
Tax 
Evasion 
(Million 
Rs.) 
Tax 
Evasion as 
% of GDP
1960 2,202 3,654 4.9 10,743 60.2 843 4.7 
1961 1,996 3,883 5.0 10,066 51.3 808 4.1 
1962 1,899 4,206 4.9 9,258 45.1 775 3.8 
1963 2,014 4,972 4.4 8,912 40.4 681 3.1 
1964 2,157 5,783 4.3 9,231 37.2 700 2.8 
1965 2,247 6,374 4.4 9,935 35.2 824 2.9 
1966 3,545 10,460 3.0 10,572 33.8 863 2.8 
1967 3,871 11,763 3.0 11,681 32.9 1,077 3.0 
1968 4,045 12,741 3.0 12,264 31.7 1,066 2.8 
1969 4,278 14,170 2.9 12,476 30.2 1,270 3.1 
1970 4,456 15,984 3.0 13,313 27.9 1,320 2.8 
1971 4,397 17,516 2.9 12,730 25.1 1,133 2.2 
1972 4,263 18,940 2.9 12,327 22.5 979 1.8 
1973 4,612 22,456 3.0 13,957 20.4 1,162 1.7 
1974 4,954 25,725 3.4 17,085 19.3 1,530 1.7 
1975 5,201 27,873 4.0 20,958 18.8 1,771 1.6 
1976 6,641 35,010 3.8 25,294 19.3 1,888 1.4 
1977 8,800 42,973 3.6 31,789 21.1 2,378 1.6 
1978 11,967 51,692 3.6 43,651 24.6 4,639 2.6 
1979 16,304 62,308 3.4 54,854 28.0 6,142 3.1 
1980 20,658 71,766 3.5 72,774 31.0 8,844 3.8 
1981 24,386 80,235 3.8 91,451 32.9 11,096 4.0 
1982 27,530 88,980 3.9 107,421 33.1 12,355 3.8 
1983 34,463 111,562 3.6 124,733 34.2 14,357 3.9 
1984 38,284 124,983 3.7 140,721 33.5 15,513 3.7 
1985 43,058 140,847 3.6 156,056 33.1 17,707 3.8 
1986 49,645 161,466 3.4 170,918 33.2 21,187 4.1 
1987 56,702 183,321 3.3 188,322 32.9 24,419 4.3 
1988 63,679 205,835 3.4 217,946 32.3 27,521 4.1 
1989 68,464 221,993 3.6 245,742 32.0 32,542 4.2 
1990 80,064 261,188 3.4 273,025 32.0 34,947 4.1 
1991 93,873 306,771 3.4 318,436 31.3 38,040 3.7 
1992 119,473 386,096 3.2 376,814 31.3 48,529 4.0 
1993 142,737 452,653 3.0 423,494 31.8 54,073 4.1 
1994 171,428 531,970 2.9 504,352 32.3 64,323 4.1 
1995 203,738 620,994 3.0 616,788 33.1 81,384 4.4 
1996 232,542 706,138 3.0 695,855 32.8 96,791 4.6 
1997 204,086 849,147 2.8 578,976 23.8 74,670 3.1 
1998 228,704 977,616 2.7 620,712 23.2 79,082 3.0 
1999 236,883 1,043,663 2.8 661,133 22.5 85,132 2.9 
2000 254,500 1,146,132 3.3 831,687 21.9 85,889 2.3 
2001 280,262 1,245,782 3.3 924,212 22.2 95,049 2.3 
2002 339,024 1,422,346 3.1 1,054,809 24.0 109,477 2.5 
2003 433,071 1,645,698 3.0 1,308,692 27.1 140,524 2.9 
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Appendix A: Comparison of Filtered vs. Actual Series 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1(a): tgr series in Equation 2          Figure 1(b): tgr series in Equation 3 
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Figure 1(c): r series in Equation 2 and 3 
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Notes 
 
1 See Schneider and Frey (2001) for further discussion. 
2 See, for instance, Fiege (1990) for an account of this taxonomy. 
3 Ahmed and Ahmed (1995) uses a dummy for 1960-1971 period based on the separation of Bangladesh (former 
East Pakistan) in 1971, which is replaced by the tax reform dummy in the present exercise. 
4 λ for tgr takes the value 50 and 10 respectively in equation 2 and 3 while λ is 50 for r in both the equations. 
Empirically, Hodrick and Prescott (1997) suggest 100≤λ and Maravall and del Rio (2001) propose 146 ≤≤ λ in 
case of annual data 
5 Plotting these two variables with black economy to GDP ratio estimated using equation 3 brings the similar 
conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  18
References 
 
Ahmed, Mehnaz and Qazi Masood Ahmed (1995) ‘Estimation of the Black Economy of Pakistan through 
the Monetary Approach’, Pakistan Development Review, Vol 34, No. 4, pp.791-807. 
 
Ahumada,-Hildegart; Garegnani,-Maria-Lorena (1999) ‘Hodrick-Prescott Filter in Practice’, Economica-
(National-University-of-La-Plata); 45(4),  pages 61-76. 
 
Aslam, S. (1998) ‘The Underground Economy and Tax Evasion in Pakistan: Annual Estimates (1960–
1998) and the Impact of Dollarization of the Economy’, The Pakistan Development Review 37:4, pp. 
621–631. 
 
Cagen, P. (1958) ‘The Demand for Currency Relative to Total Money Supply’, Journal of Political 
Economy 66, pp. 303–28. 
 
Feige, Edgar L. (1979) ‘How Big is Irregular Economy?’ Challenge22. Nov.-Dec. 
 
Feige, Edgar L. (1990) ‘Defining and Estimating Underground and Informal Economies: The New 
Institutional Economics Approach’, World Development 18 (7), July 1990, pp.989-1002. 
 
Frey, Bruno S., and Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1984) ‘The Hidden Economy as an ‘Unobservable’ 
Variable’, European Economic Review, 26, 33-53. 
 
Guttman, Peter M. (1977) ‘The Subterranean Economy’, Financial Analyst Journal 26-34, Nov.-Dec. 
 
  19
Hodrick, R.J. and E.C. Prescott (1997) ‘Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation’, 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 29, 1–16. 
 
Iqbal, Z., S. K. Qureshi, and R. Mahmood (1998) ‘The Underground Economy and Tax Evasion in 
Pakistan: A Fresh Assessment’, PIDE Research Report No. 158. 
 
Kemal, Ali (2003) ‘Underground Economy and Tax Evasion in Pakistan: A Critical Evaluation’, PIDE 
Research Report No. 184. 
 
Maravall, A. and del Rio, A. (2001) ‘Time Aggregation and The Hodrick-Prescott Filter’, Working Paper 
0108, Research Department, Banco de España. 
 
Pakistan, Government of (various issues), Pakistan Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance. 
 
Pakistan, State Bank of (various issues), SBP Annual Report. 
 
Qureshi, M. Munir (1989) Fiscal Imperatives in Pakistan’s Economic Development, Progressive 
Publishers, Lahore, Pakistan. 
 
Ravn, M., and Uhlig, H.(1997) ‘On adjusting the HP-Filter for the Frequency of Observations’. Tilburg 
University Working Paper. 
 
Schneider, Friedrich and Bruno S. Frey (2001) Informal and Underground Economy, Economics, in 
Ashenfelter, Orley, in International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Science, Vol. 12, Elsevier 
Science Publishing Company, Amsterdam. 
 
  20
Shabsigh, Ghiath (1995) ‘The Underground Economy: Estimation, and Economic and Policy Implications 
- The Case of Pakistan’, IMF Working Paper: 95/101, October. 
 
Tanzi, Vito (1980) ‘The Underground Economy in the United States: Estimates and Implications’. Banca 
Nazionale Del Lavaro. (Quarterly Review). Dec. 
 
Tanzi, Vito (1982) Underground Economy and Tax Evasion in the United States: Estimates and 
Implications, In Vito Tanzi (ed) The Underground Economy in the United States and Aborad. Lexington, 
MA: Lexington Books. 
 
Tanzi, Vito (1983) ‘The Underground Economy in the United States: Annual Estimates 1930-1980’, IMF 
Staff Papers. 3:2 283-305. 
 
Yasmin, Bushra and Hira Rauf (2004) ‘Measuring the Underground Economy and its Impact on the 
Economy of Pakistan’, The Lahore Journal of Economics, Vol.-9,  No. 2, July-December. 
 
 
